


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018046

Date: 08 Apr 2018 Time: 1331Z Position: 5612N 00326W Location: Kinross

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	T600N	HPH Shark (Glider)
Operator	Civ Pte	Civ Pte
Airspace	Scottish FIR	Scottish FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	None
Altitude/FL		
Transponder	Not fitted	Not fitted
Reported		
Colours	Red, Yellow	White
Lighting	Wingtip strobes	Nil
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	1400ft	1552ft
Altimeter	QFE (992hPa)	NK
Heading	070°	SSW
Speed	60kt	75kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	FLARM
Alert	N/A	None
Separation		
Reported	0ft V/10m H	0ft V/50m H
Recorded	NK	



THE T600N PILOT reports that he had just taken-off with a student and was listening out on Safety Comm. They were intending to climb to a circuit height of 1500ft and depart to the west from the overhead. He was still climbing at the end of the downwind leg and turning onto 'base' when a glider suddenly appeared immediately ahead, no more than 30-50m away. He rolled hard to port and the glider appeared to push hard forward into a dive. The glider passed slightly below and within about 10m to the starboard. He tried to remain visual with it to see where it had gone but lost sight of it, so he routed back to the airfield where he circled and contacted the ground station. The radio happened to be manned by a retired ATCO, who then checked Flightradar24 and found the callsign of the glider. He commented that Balado airfield was marked on the aviation charts, yet still gliders kept flying through the circuit without radio contact.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE HPH SHARK PILOT reports that he was flying south-west of Kinross after not finding any lift over Kinross. He did a general scan, then began the procedures for starting his glider's sustainer engine. After the engine had deployed and he had ascertained that it was in the up position, he continued with starting it. At this point he did another general scan and was very surprised to see a powered aircraft in the 2 o'clock position, heading east and at the same level. He promptly put the glider into a dive and banked away from the other aircraft. There was no FLARM warning for the incident, so he assumed the micro-light was not FLARM equipped.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Edinburgh was recorded as follows:

METAR EGPB 081320Z AUTO VRB03KT 9999 FEW022 OVC044 11/07 Q1008=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The T600N and HPH Shark pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹, if the geometry is considered to be head-on then both pilots were required to turn to the right, notwithstanding overriding need to avoid the other aircraft.

The aircraft did not display on NATS radars due to their location and altitude.

Comments

BGA

This incident has triggered detailed discussions between the gliding operation at Portmoak and the Microlight Academy at Balado. Cordial communications have been established and both groups now have a much better appreciation of the other's operation. Glider pilots flying from Portmoak are now briefed to make radio calls when in the vicinity of Balado.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a T600N and a HPH Shark glider flew into proximity at 1331hrs on Sunday 8th April 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither were in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and radar photographs/video recordings.

The Board first looked at the actions of the T600N pilot. He had just taken off from Balado airfield, and was planning to climb in the overhead for a westerly departure; there is no ATC or radio frequency at Balado and pilots operate on Safety Comm. As he climbed on the downwind leg, he came head-to-head with a glider and took avoiding action. Other than ensuring a robust lookout at all times, the Board thought that there was very little he could have done differently in the circumstances to avoid the situation.

For his part, the Board noted that the glider pilot had been struggling to find lift and had started to deploy his sustainer engine. Although he reported conducting lookout whilst he did so, members wondered whether deploying his sustainer had become a distraction for him. Although Balado doesn't have an ATZ, it was still incumbent on the glider pilot to keep clear or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by the T600N, and the Board heard from the glider member that, until recently, it had been difficult for the Portmoak glider pilots to find out whether Balado was active or not. However, as a result of this Airprox, the Board were heartened to hear a dialogue had now been set up with better liaison between the two units and glider pilots were being briefed to call on Safety Comm as they passed close to Balado airfield.

Turning to the cause and risk of the Airprox, the Board quickly agreed that the glider pilot had not avoided the pattern of traffic formed by the T600N, and thought that there was a contributory factor in

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

that the glider pilot had been distracted by deploying his sustainer engine. In assessing the risk, the Board noted that both pilots had had to take emergency avoiding action after late sightings. Some members thought that the risk had been such that a collision had only been avoided by the bare minimum (Category A); however, the majority view was that the pilots had probably been sufficiently able to materially increase separation despite the late sighting, and so the risk was agreed as Category B, safety had been much reduced below the norm.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: The HPH Shark pilot did not avoid the pattern of traffic formed by the T600N in the visual circuit at Balado.

Contributory Factor: The HPH Shark pilot was distracted by getting his sustainer engine out.

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment²

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Crew:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures, Instructions and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the glider pilot flew through the promulgated and active Balado microlight site.

Tactical Planning was assessed as **partially effective** because the glider pilot did not sufficiently avoid the microlight site.

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any information on the other aircraft.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective**; although the glider was fitted with FLARM, the microlight was not.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective**, both pilots managed to take avoiding action, albeit late.



² The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).